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Greenberg Traurig, LLP v. Frias Holding Company, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 67 (Aug. 7, 2014)1 
 
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE: ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT 
 
Summary 
 
The Court adopted an exception to the common law litigation privilege for legal 
malpractice and professional negligence actions. A client can pursue malpractice and 
professional negligence actions against an attorney, and support those actions with 
communications made in the course of litigation. 
 
Background 
 
In 2005, Mark James and Scott Bertzyk were opposing counsel in a commercial litigation 
matter. James, at the time, was an attorney at Bullivant Houser Bailey, P.C., and represented the 
sellers, Hotels Nevada, LLC and Inns Nevada, LLC (Hotels). Bertzyk was an attorney at 
Greenberg Traurig, LLP (Greenberg), and represented the buyer, L.A. Pacific Center (LAP). 
Prior to final resolution, James transitioned out of the litigation after becoming president and 
CEO of Frias Holding Company (FHC), a taxi and limousine service company. 
When the matter went to arbitration, Bertzyk asserted that James had committed 
misconduct. According to James, before the arbitration panel issued the final award, Bertzyk 
suggested to Hotels’s new attorneys that Hotels should explore a malpractice suit against its 
former attorneys, including James. 
Meanwhile, James, in his new capacity as president and CEO of FHC, retained two 
attorneys at Greenberg for intellectual property and gaming license issues. James was aware of 
Greenberg’s representation of LAP, but the firm did not inform James of Bertzyk’s statements 
made during arbitration of the earlier matter. During Greenberg’s representation of James, LAP 
filed suit against Bullivant Houser Bailey alleging attorney misconduct. Bertzyk provided a 
declaration that reasserted negative claims against James. 
After learning of Bertzyk’s actions, James and FHC (collectively, respondents) severed 
their relationship with Greenberg, and filed a malpractice suit against Bertzyk and Greenberg 
(collectively, appellants) in Nevada district court, alleging respondent’s representation of LAP in 
a suit against James called into question Greenberg’s ability to represent James and FHC. The 
parties removed to federal court 2 . Appellants moved to dismiss, arguing that the litigation 
privilege barred respondent’s claims. 
The federal court denied appellants’ motion without prejudice because Nevada courts had 
not addressed the legal-malpractice exception to the litigation privilege. Noting the silence of 
Nevada case law on the matter, the federal court certified this question to the Nevada Supreme 
Court3: “Whether Nevada law recognizes an exception to the common law litigation privilege for 
legal malpractice and professional negligence actions.” 
 
 
 
                                                        
1
  By Tom Stewart. 
2  Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. 
3  Pursuant to NRAP 5. 
Discussion 
 
Litigation privilege 
  
 Nevada recognized has adopted the “long standing common law rule that 
communications uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely 
privileged,” shielding those who made the communications from civil liability in tort.4  The 
“litigation privilege” provides attorneys, as officers of the court, the freedom and protection to 
zealously advocate for their clients. Though considered “absolute,” the Court has recognized 
there are limitations to the privilege. For example, it only applies to statements or 
communications that are “in some way pertinent” to the subject matter of the case,5 and does not 
shield an attorney from discipline by the Bar6. 
 
The legal-malpractice exception to the litigation privilege 
 
 Nevada case law was silent on whether the privilege extended to communications at issue 
in professional negligence and/or legal-malpractice suits was a matter of first impression for the 
Court. Looking to outside jurisdictions for guidance, the Court noted that many states recognize 
that the privilege is inapplicable to a client’s claim for malpractice or negligence against their 
attorney.7 Few courts have found the privilege to bar malpractice claims.8 
 
Nevada recognizes the legal-malpractice exception 
 
 The Court found the rationale behind the legal-malpractice exception to the litigation 
privilege convincing, and adopted the exception. The privilege is designed to allow attorneys 
ample freedom in the representation of clients. Shielding attorneys from reprimand, if their 
clients allege improper legal representation, would be contrary to the aim of the privilege itself. 
Therefore, it would be unsound policy to allow the privilege to shield attorneys from malpractice 
claims brought by their clients.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Court adopted an exception to the litigation privilege in the case of legal malpractice 
and professional negligence actions. Communications made in the course of litigation are not 
absolutely privileged, and can be used to support legal malpractice and professional negligence 
actions by a client, against its attorney. 
                                                        
4
  Fink v. Oshins, 118 Nev. 428, 432-33, 49 P.3d 640, 643 (2002) (quoting Circus Circus Hotels v. Witherspoon, 99 
Nev. 56, 60, 657 P.2d 101, 104 (1983)). 
5
  Id. at 433, 49 P.3d at 644 (internal quotation omitted). 
6
  Bull v. McCuskey, 96 Nev. 706, 712, 615 P.2d 957, 962 (1980). 
7
  Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh & Hammerton, 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 719 (Ct. App. 2006); Buchanan v. Leonard, 52 
A.3d 1064, 1070 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2012). 
8
  See O'Neil v. Cunningham, 173 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1981) (applying a California statute to bar a client's 
defamation action against his attorney); Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes, & Lerach, LLP, 175 F.3d 14, 17 
(1st Cir. 1999) (applying New Hampshire Law and concluding that the litigation privilege barred "legal malpractice 
claims"). 
